| Intelligence report describes unraveling of Iraq |
|
|
|
Iraq is unraveling at an accelerating rate, and even if U.S. and Iraqi forces can slow the spreading violence, the country's fragile government is unlikely to deliver stability to its people during the next year, according to a much-anticipated assessment by America's intelligence agencies. 3rd Feb 07- Greg Miller, LA Times The report, titled "Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead," catalogs an array of forces pulling the country apart and concludes that to call the situation a civil war "does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict" because the causes of violence are so varied. The assessment says there are scenarios that could lead to political progress and slow recovery, but also identifies "triggering events" that could push Iraq into complete chaos, with neighboring nations choosing sides in what could become a regional conflagration. "Given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard-pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the (18-month) time frame of this estimate," the report says in a blunt, bottom-line summary. The document, known as a National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, does not specifically address the prospects for success of President Bush's plan to send an extra 21,500 troop to Iraq in the coming months in an attempt to secure Baghdad. But the report provides fodder for proponents and critics of that plan. It warns that the presence of U.S. troops remains "an essential stabilizing element in Iraq," and that if there were a rapid withdrawal, Iraqi security forces "would be unlikely to survive as a nonsectarian national institution." In such a scenario, neighboring countries -- including Iran and Saudi Arabia -- "might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacem ent would be probable." White House officials argued that this assessment helps make the case for the president's plan, which is under increasing fire on Capitol Hill. "This NIE is not at war with this ... new strategy the president has developed," national security adviser Stephen Hadley told reporters. The assessment, he said, "explains why the president concluded that a new approach, a new strategy was required," and the report "generally supports it." But the document also notes that "even if violence is diminished" over the next 12 to 18 months, prospects for "sustained political reconciliation" among Iraq's warring factions are dim. That means that even under optimistic scenarios, the nation's top intelligence analysts do not envision meaningful stability within the period during which Bush has said additional U.S. troops would be deployed -- raising the prospect that the so-called "surge" might drag on much longer than the administration has indicated. Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a contender for his party's 2008 presidential nomination, called the report "a devastating repudiation of the president's new tactics in Iraq."
Most Democrats and some Republican senators have lined up behind Warner's measure, expected to be debated next week.
The NIE was assembled by the nation's top intelligence officials, and represents the consensus of all 16 U.S. spy agencies. The Director of National Intelligence took the extraordinary step of releasing the document's key judgments publicly even as the full, 90-page classified version was being delivered to members of Congress and senior government officials. In outlining the factors that have pushed Iraq toward chaos, the report cites the "insecurity" of Shiites who were repressed for decades under dictator Saddam Hussein, a Sunni; the refusal of Sunnis to accept their declining political fortunes in the wake of the toppling of Saddam's regime in early 2003; and the disappearance of a large swath of the Iraqi "professional and entrepreneurial classes" that has fled to neighboring countries. The report offers a bleak assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces that are supposed to play the leading role under Bush's plan in stemming the violence in Baghdad and elsewhere in the country. These forces will be "hard pressed" to carry out their responsibilities and operate against Shia militias, the report concludes. The reasons for this, it says, include sectarian divisions that "erode the dependability of many units." The report adds that the forces "are hampered by personnel and equipment shortfalls, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside the areas where they were recruited." That assessment seems at odds with recent assertions by U.S. military officials, including Gen. George Casey Jr., who testified before Congress on Thursday that "Iraqis are poised to assume responsibility for their own security by the end of 2007, still with some level of support from us." Echoing concerns that Bush has raised, the NIE warns that if the United States were to withdraw, al-Qaida "would attempt to use parts of the country -- particularly Anbar province -- to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq." But the document does not indicate that intelligence officials believe Iraq is poised to become an al-Qaida sanctuary -- a scenario cited frequently by Bush as a reason for rejecting calls for setting specific timetables for a withdrawal of U.S. forces. The NIE is measured in its assessment of the roles played by Iran and Syria in fostering the violence in Iraq. The report says that Iran has fueled the fighting by providing "lethal support" to groups of Iraqi Shia militants, and that Syria continues to provide safe haven for displaced members of Saddam's Baath party. Even so, the report finds that meddling by Iran and Syria "is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq's internal sectarian dynamics." Bush and other administration officials have stepped up their criticism of the role Iran is playing in Iraq, with the president giving U.S. forces greater latitude to pursue Iranians who are fomenting violence in the country. The role played by Iraq's neighbors was the subject of some dissension among intelligence officials involved in assembling the report. The classified portions of the NIE is said to include "alternate" judgments that reflect disagreements over whether the Syrian government is directly involved in allowing Islamic militants to cross its border into Iraq and the extent to which Iran is aware of and tolerating al-Qaida activity in its territory. In giving the alternate assessments prominent placement alongside the document's key judgments, U.S. intelligence officials said they were responding to criticism of previous NIE document ts in which dissenting views were often relegated to footnote status and overlooked by policymakers. Downplaying dissenting views was one of many major flaws of an NIE produced before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March, 2003, which concluded erroneously that Iraq had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and was pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. The new NIE concludes with a discussion of scenarios that could push Iraq into deeper chaos. The "triggering events" could include mass sectarian killings, assassinations of major religious or political figures, and Sunni defection from the government, it says. "Should these events take place, they could spark an abrupt increase" in violence and shift Iraq's course "from gradual decline to rapid deterioration with grave humanitarian, political and security consequences," according to the report. It says "three prospective security paths might then emerge," including a "de facto" partition of the country into sectarian groups; the emergence of a "Shia strongman" seizing control of the country, and an atomization of the nation into a "checkered pattern" of local militias and groups. Times staff writers Maura Reynolds and Noam N. Levey contributed to this report. Link to original source
|