The UN has stated that oil supply is expected to plateau in 2020 - a shocking development that has the potential to cause severe economic, social and political disruption unless dependence on petroleum is curbed, argues George Monbiot.
Global oil
production will peak much earlier than expected amid a collapse in
petroleum investment due to the credit crunch, one of the world's
foremost experts has revealed.
Fatih Birol, chief economist to
the International Energy Agency, told the Guardian that conventional
crude output could plateau in 2020, a development that was "not good
news" for a world still heavily dependent on petroleum.
The
prediction came as oil companies from Saudi Arabia to Canada cut their
capital expenditure on new projects in response to a fall in oil
prices, moves that will further reduce supply in future.
Birol's
comments will give more ammunition to those who warn that the British
government is dangerously complacent in not trying to wean the country
off oil as quickly as possible. Some observers believe that, because
the global economy is underpinned by oil, the peaking of supply will
cause severe economic, social and political disruption unless prepared
for over many years.
John Hemming, chairman of the All Party
Parliamentary Group on Peak Oil and Gas, said Birol's "conversion" was
significant. "The penny has finally dropped - geological issues matter
as well as political and economic. The IEA - unlike our government -
appears to be leaving cloud cuckoo land finally," he added.
The
IEA has never before been specific about the point at which so-called
conventional oil would peak. It said last month that total crude output
could peak in 2030. Birol's comments follow other signs that the IEA is
rapidly changing its view. In its 2007 World Energy Outlook, the IEA
predicted a rate of decline from the world's existing oil fields at
3.7%, only to admit 12 months later that the speed of the fall was more
likely 6.7%.
Jeremy Leggett, chief executive of solar energy
company Solarcentury, said Birol's views underplayed the scale of the
problem. "The IEA is very constrained in what it can say - by the
demands of its constituent governments - so you have to read between
the lines. We believe that peak oil will come about in 2013 at the
latest but the real concern from the IEA is the adjustment of
production figures," he said.
The energy agency, which represents
most western governments including the UK and US, has been backtracking
rapidly on previous positions.
Three years ago the Paris-based organisation still denied there was any fundamental threat to the world's petroleum economy.
If
you ask, the government always produces the same response: "Global oil
resources are adequate for the foreseeable future." It knows this, it
says, because of the assessments made by the International Energy
Agency (IEA) in its World Energy Outlook reports. In the 2007 report,
the IEA does appear to support the government's view. "World oil
resources," it states, "are judged to be sufficient to meet the
projected growth in demand to 2030," though it says nothing about what
happens at that point, or whether they will continue to be sufficient
after 2030. But this, as far as Whitehall is concerned, is the end of
the matter.
Like most of the rich world's governments, the UK treats
the IEA's projections as gospel. Earlier this year, I submitted a
freedom of information request to the UK's department for business,
asking what contingency plans the government has made for global
supplies of oil peaking by 2020. The answer was as follows: "The
government does not feel the need to hold contingency plans
specifically for the eventuality of crude-oil supplies peaking between
now and 2020."
So the IEA had better be right. In the report on
peak oil commissioned by the US department of energy, the oil analyst
Robert L Hirsch concluded that "without timely mitigation, the
economic, social and political costs" of world oil supplies peaking
"will be unprecedented". He went on to explain what "timely mitigation"
meant. Even a worldwide emergency response "10 years before world oil
peaking", he wrote, would leave "a liquid-fuels shortfall roughly a
decade after the time that oil would have peaked". To avoid global
economic collapse, we need to begin "a mitigation crash programme 20
years before peaking". If Hirsch is right, and if oil supplies peak
before 2028, we're in deep doodah.
So burn this into your mind:
between 2007 and 2008 the IEA radically changed its assessment. Until
this year's report, the agency mocked people who said that oil supplies
might peak. In the foreword to a book it published in 2005, its
executive director, Claude Mandil, dismissed those who warned of this
event as "doomsayers". "The IEA has long maintained that none of this
is a cause for concern," he wrote. "Hydrocarbon resources around the
world are abundant and will easily fuel the world through its
transition to a sustainable energy future."
In its 2007 World Energy
Outlook, the IEA predicted a rate of decline in output from the world's
existing oilfields of 3.7% a year. This, it said, presented a
short-term challenge, with the possibility of a temporary supply crunch
in 2015, but with sufficient investment any shortfall could be covered.
But the new report, published last month, carried a very different
message: a projected rate of decline of 6.7%, which means a much
greater gap to fill.
More importantly, in the 2008 report the
IEA suggests for the first time that world petroleum supplies might hit
the buffers. "Although global oil production in total is not expected
to peak before 2030, production of conventional oil ... is projected to
level off towards the end of the projection period." These bland words
reveal a major shift. Never before has one of the IEA's energy outlooks
forecast the peaking or plateauing of the world's conventional oil
production (which is what we mean when we talk about peak oil).
But
that is as specific as the report gets. Does it or doesn't it mean that
we have time to prepare? What does "towards the end of the projection
period" mean? The agency has never produced a more precise forecast -
until now. For the first time, in the interview I conducted with its
chief economist Fatih Birol recently, it has given us a date. And it
should scare the pants off anyone who understands the implications.
Birol,
the lead author of the new energy outlook, is a small, shrewd,
unflustered man with thick grey hair and Alistair Darling eyebrows. He
explained to me that the agency's new projections were based on a major
study it had undertaken into decline rates in the world's 800 largest
oilfields. So what were its previous figures based on? "It was mainly
an assumption, a global assumption about the world's oil fields. This
year, we looked at it country by country, field by field and we looked
at it also onshore and offshore. It was very, very detailed.
Last year
it was an assumption, and this year it's a finding of our study." I
told him that it seemed extraordinary to me that the IEA hadn't done
this work before, but had based its assessment on educated guesswork.
"In fact nobody had done this research," he told me. "This is the first
publicly available data."
So was it not irresponsible to publish
a decline rate of 3.7% in 2007, when there was no proper research
supporting it? "No, our previous decline assumptions have always
mentioned that these are assumptions to the best of our knowledge - and
we also said that the declines [could be] higher than what we have
assumed."
Then I asked him a question for which I didn't expect
a straight answer: could he give me a precise date by which he expects
conventional oil supplies to stop growing?
"In terms of
non-Opec [countries outside the big oil producers' cartel]," he
replied, "we are expecting that in three, four years' time the
production of conventional oil will come to a plateau, and start to
decline. In terms of the global picture, assuming that Opec will invest
in a timely manner, global conventional oil can still continue, but we
still expect that it will come around 2020 to a plateau as well, which
is, of course, not good news from a global-oil-supply point of view."
Around
2020. That casts the issue in quite a different light. Birol's date, if
correct, gives us about 11 years to prepare. If the Hirsch report is
right, we have already missed the boat. Birol says we need a "global
energy revolution" to avoid an oil crunch, including (disastrously for
the environment) a massive global drive to exploit unconventional oils,
such as the Canadian tar sands. But nothing on this scale has yet
happened, and Hirsch suggests that even if it began today, the
necessary investments and infrastructure changes could not be made in
time. Birol told me: "I think time is not on our side here."
When
I pressed him on the shift in the agency's position, he argued that the
IEA has been saying something like this all along. "We said in the past
that one day we will run out of oil. We never said that we will have
hundreds of years of oil ... but what we have said is that this year,
compared with past years, we have seen that the decline rates are
significantly higher than what we have seen before. But our line that
we are on an unsustainable energy path has not changed."
This,
of course, is face-saving nonsense. There is a vast difference between
a decline rate of 3.7% and 6.7%. There is an even bigger difference
between suggesting that the world is following an unsustainable energy
path - a statement almost everyone can subscribe to - and revealing
that conventional oil supplies are likely to plateau around 2020. If
this is what the IEA meant in the past, it wasn't expressing itself
very clearly.
So what do we do? We could take to the hills, or
we could hope and pray that Hirsch is wrong about the 20-year lead
time, and begin a global crash programme today of fuel efficiency and
electrification. In either case, the British government had better
start drawing up some contingency plans.
Watch George Monbiot talking to Fatih Birol as part of the Monbiot
Meets video series, in which Britain's leading green commentator
challenges the world's top environmental policy-makers.
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