Financing the global sharing economy, part three (10): protect import tariffs

STWR
01 October 2012

Key points:

  • The lowering of import tariffs can reduce government revenues significantly, especially for poor countries that fund a major proportion of their state budgets through trade taxes.
  • If the Doha Round of world trade talks is completed, poor countries could lose $63.4bn through reductions in import tariffs.
  • Bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) are expected to cause further significant losses in tariff revenues. For example, an FTA with the European Union could cost sub-Saharan African economies $2.6bn per year.  
  • The wider impacts of trade liberalisation lead to much greater losses in national income for developing countries, mainly due to its devastating impact on domestic agricultural and industrial production. Low-income countries lost a staggering $896bn as a result of trade liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s.
  • Rich nations and global institutions must stop compelling poor countries to liberalise their economies through the World Trade Organization or free trade agreements, and instead allow governments the policy space they need to regulate their national economies in accordance with development objectives.  


Import tariffs (also called customs duties or trade taxes) are an important source of government revenue for developing countries. These taxes can also help stimulate the growth of infant industries and protect less advanced economies from cheaper and often heavily subsidised imports. Even though import tariffs and other ‘protectionist' measures played a crucial role in the economic development of industrialised nations, the sovereign right of developing nations to follow a similar path is being violated through the ‘free market' mantra of trade liberalisation, which is compelling developing countries to dismantle these and other forms of economic protection.

This unjust economic paradigm must urgently be replaced by a pro-poor approach to international commerce that respects the right of developing nations to choose trade policies that help promote their economic development. Allowing poorer countries to maintain taxes on foreign goods entering their borders can provide tens of billions of dollars in additional revenues - money that is critical if governments are to finance poverty eradication and social protection programs from their own resources.

Given the excessive influence of a ‘neoliberal' or pro-market ideology over governments and international financial institutions in recent decades, the pressure for developing countries to liberalise their trade systems comes in many guises [see box in introduction]. For instance, the rules governing trade between the Global North and South are negotiated undemocratically within the World Trade Organisation (WTO); free trade agreements are signed between individual governments and groups of countries despite widespread opposition by civil society groups; and trade liberalisation is foisted upon developing countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a condition to financial assistance offered in the form of debt relief, loans and grants.

Under this tremendous pressure and left with few alternatives, cash-strapped nations are often forced to open up their borders to international competition by reducing import tariffs and other barriers to trade [see note].[1] Doing so makes it easier and more profitable for producers in industrialised countries to export their goods, and presents new markets in the developing world for multinational corporations. Liberalisation is not necessarily a bad thing all the time for poorer countries either, as it can allow them to import goods that are helpful to their industrial development and that they do not produce themselves, such as machinery and technology. It can also provide exporters in developing countries with access to new markets, and lead to increased foreign investment.

But wholesale and rapid liberalisation can have an extremely harmful impact on low- and middle-income countries, particularly as the reduction in import tariffs significantly reduces essential government revenues. Although some free trade advocates argue that the loss of income is relatively small, research has contradicted this view and shows that tariff losses for developing countries are significant and can far outweigh the benefits of liberalisation.[2] Along with other free-market reforms imposed on poorer countries since the 1980s, the sudden lowering of trade barriers can also be part of a one-size-fits-all approach to economic policy that can devastate local industries, lead to massive job losses, and restrict the ability of governments to make policy decisions that are appropriate to their specific development needs.[3]

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Boosting state revenue

Whereas import tariffs account for less than 1% of government revenues in rich countries, many developing countries rely heavily on them to help fund their state budgets. This is because import duties are among the easiest to collect and less costly to administer than other forms of taxation, which is especially important for countries with a large informal sector and less administrative capacity. Some poor countries such as Bangladesh, Namibia and Senegal finance around a third of their entire state budgets through trade tariffs.[4] In the case of Botswana, reliance on trade taxes is among the highest levels in the world but they are still one of the fastest growing economies in Africa.[5]

As free trade policies continue to be negotiated around the world, revenues from import tariffs have significantly declined in almost all countries. In 1995, customs revenues as a proportion of overall state revenue averaged 17% in low- and middle-income countries.[6] By 2009, these revenues had reduced significantly for these countries to an average of 7%.[7] For African countries alone, trade taxes declined by a third as a share of GDP between 1996 and 2007 [see figure 1].[8] For many poorer countries, the loss in revenue from taxes on international trade has been extreme; in Zambia, for example, tariff revenues accounted for 36% of state revenue in 1995, compared to 8% in 2009. In Tunisia, the proportion dropped from 28% of state revenue in 1995 to 6% in 2009 [see table 9].[9]

To justify the elimination of import barriers and trade tariffs in the South, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) theorised that losses in customs revenue would be compensated by the introduction or increase of other domestic taxes on purchases, such as a Value Added Tax (VAT). However, comprehensive research by the IMF now demonstrates that low-income countries have only been able to recoup around 30% of what they have lost from reduced import taxes since the early 1980s.[10] Compared to import tariffs, VAT is particularly ineffective at raising government revenues in countries with large informal sectors, and its collection requires a sophisticated administration process that is beyond the means of many poorer countries. Without appropriate exemptions in place for necessity goods, VAT can also be a regressive form of taxation that disproportionately affects those on lower incomes.[11]

Despite the well-documented harmful impacts of liberalisation on developing countries [see box], multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements continue to impose severe restrictions on their income from tariffs. The ongoing multilateral negotiations within the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could result in losses of $63.4bn for developing countries through lost import tax revenues on non-agricultural goods alone - a figure that may have increased significantly in recent years with the growth in international trade volumes.[12] This sum is four times higher than what the World Bank predicts these countries would gain in increased trade if the Doha round of negotiations is successful.[13]      

Controversial free trade agreements also continue to be negotiated between governments seeking new markets for their produce. For example, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) economies are expected to have a significant negative impact on fiscal revenues for the ACP countries as a result of eliminating customs duties on the imports of most EU products. A recent analysis of the impact of EPAs on African countries by the South Centre calculated that the financial benefits of easier access to European markets were far outweighed by heavy losses in government revenue from tariff reductions. Using a simple cost-benefit analysis, the study conservatively estimated annual net losses to exceed $1.275bn for Africa's least developed countries, and $2.603bn for all countries in sub-Saharan Africa [see note].[14]    

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The wider impacts of trade liberalisation

Beyond the loss of revenues from customs duties, trade liberalisation can lead to even greater losses in national income for developing countries. Dismantling import tariffs and other barriers to trade leaves many farmers and local industries unable to compete with the flood of cheap imports that enter the country, often leading to factories closing, rising unemployment and lower incomes. In the case of agricultural imports, these negative impacts are exacerbated by the massive subsidies that governments in rich countries pay their farmers, which results in the overproduction and export of artificially cheap food to developing countries. As an additional blow, rich countries in the North still maintain their own import tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to trade in key sectors such as agriculture and textiles, making it difficult for producers in developing countries to export and sell their goods abroad [see section 6 of this report on agricultural subsidies].

In the long run, the devastation caused to domestic industries by trade liberalisation can lead to substantial losses in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for some of the poorest countries. According to research by Christian Aid, trade liberalisation cost 32 low-income countries across Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa a total of $896bn over 20 years.[15] Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole lost $272bn during the 1980s and 1990s as a result of trade liberalisation - enough money to wipe out their debts and have sufficient left over to pay for every child to be vaccinated and go to school.[16] When combined with debt repayments, capital flight and illicit capital flows, the effects of such revenue losses can cripple the economies of poor countries.     

If the international community is serious about helping countries in the South to develop their economies and grow their way out of poverty, more must be done to help protect their infant industries and domestic producers from international competition, at least until they are robust enough to trade on an equal footing. As well argued by Ha-Joon Chang and other economists, the policies for industrial development employed by the now-developed countries - including Britain, the USA, Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan, Korea and Taiwan - were not based on a laissez-faire ideology of free trade, but instead used protectionist strategies for key industries in the earlier phases of development. For low-income countries trying to develop their economies along similar lines to industrialised nations, trade liberalisation can be tantamount to ‘kicking away the ladder' of protectionist tariffs and subsidies that the rich countries employed in their earlier development paths.[17]

In order for developing countries to enjoy the same benefits that rich countries have long possessed, they must be given the policy space to maintain their import tariffs and not come under pressure from developed countries or multilateral institutions to liberalise their economies, whether as a condition of free trade agreements or in return for financial assistance. In accordance with the principle of ‘Special and Differential Treatment' in WTO negotiations [see below], sovereign nations should retain the right to raise tariffs in line with domestic strategies for economic development.  

How much revenue could be mobilised

The following examples illustrate the significant gains that governments in developing countries could make if they are allowed to maintain tariff levels and regulate their national economies in accordance with their own development objectives.

If developing countries were not obligated to reduce their tariffs within the Doha round of trade talks, they would be able to save more than $63.4bn in existing annual government revenues.[18]  

Of the many bilateral and regional free trade agreements in operation or under negotiation, reforming the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) alone could ensure that sub-Saharan African countries save an estimated $2.6bn each year.[19]

The battle for trade justice

Despite the destructive social, political and environmental consequences of the pro-corporate model of economic globalisation, Northern governments continue to push free trade through the WTO and bilateral agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade accord (TPP), or the European Union's most recent trade strategy known as ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs'. As a result of this further liberalisation, trade tax revenues are set to continue to decline over the years ahead.

Since the Doha Development Agenda (or Doha Round) was launched in 2001, supposedly to enhance the equitable participation of poorer countries in world trade, WTO negotiations have repeatedly broken down and still remain inconclusive. At the heart of the impasse in negotiations is the debate over tariff cuts, which are felt to exact extreme demands on developing countries while being unfairly balanced in favour of rich industrialised nations. This is particularly the case in the negotiations on industrial goods.[20] Since most developing countries have quite high industrial tariffs, their tariffs will be cut far more steeply than the tariffs of developed countries, by up to 70% in some major developing countries compared to only around 25% for the industrialised nations.[21] Developing countries will also be obliged to cut their agricultural tariffs by a further 36% if the Doha Round of talks is concluded, while the United States is trying to open up their service sectors even further to foreign ownership and competition.[22]

Various concessions are negotiated for developing countries under the principle of ‘Special and Differential Treatment', which is meant to address historical and structural considerations and re-balance the inequitable WTO rules towards development concerns. However these measures, such as duty-free and quota-free access to developed country markets, are widely held by campaign groups as being insufficient to address the structural inequality of the trading system. The lack of agreement surrounding some of these concessions was a key reason why the Doha meeting in July 2008 collapsed, and remains a major sticking point today. By the end of 2011, WTO members openly acknowledged at a Ministerial Conference - the WTO's highest decision-making body - that the talks had reached an impasse.[23] Now in its eleventh year, the Doha Round has few cheerleaders left among its members and some advocate winding up Doha completely in order to take on new agendas.[24]

Whatever the outcome for the international trade negotiations, bilateral and regional trade deals generally demand even greater tariff cuts than those negotiated in the WTO. For example, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are exempted from many of the tariff reductions in WTO negotiations on agriculture, services and industrial goods. But in the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the EU is demanding that the ACP countries cut 80% of all their tariffs to zero.[25] With limited hopes of multilateral negotiations succeeding, the US and other countries are also now considering ‘plurilateral' trade agreements with a select number of countries. This poses a further risk that developing country issues are dropped while those nations with the most resources pursue their own priorities.

Rethinking economic globalisation

By no means is everyone convinced that world prosperity is dependent upon the commandments of free trade and economic globalisation. Unjust trade rules and agreements have sparked widespread opposition amongst indigenous groups and campaigners in recent decades, most memorably at the ‘battle of Seattle' when around 100,000 protestors rallied against the WTO Ministerial Conference of 1999. Today, unjust terms and bullying tactics by the powerful nations remains widely acknowledged by developing countries as a major impediment to the successful conclusion of international trade negotiations. Many civil society organisations call for fundamental change in the way trade rules are negotiated, and have long pushed to end the Doha round completely rather than lock in policies that will undermine the development prospects of countries in the Global South.[26]

There are some signs that world leaders are beginning to rethink the neoliberal ideology of recent decades that has forced poor countries to open up their markets through drastic reductions in tariffs. At the Gleneagles summit in 2005, the G8 promised that in future they will not impose import liberalisation on weak economies. The Commission on Africa set up by Tony Blair also concluded that there should not be pressures on Africa to liberalise their imports before countries are able to withstand it. This sentiment was shared by former President Bill Clinton in 2008 when he said that global leaders "blew it" by forcing poor countries to liberalise their agricultural sectors through structural adjustment policies. In the wake of the global financial crisis, both Gordon Brown and Nicholas Sarkozy also stated that the Washington Consensus of free markets is now dead, referring to the set of policies that pressured developing countries to set tariffs even lower than those agreed at the WTO.

Recently, the WTO rules were slightly relaxed to allow least developed countries joining the WTO a little more policy flexibility in relation to their import taxes, although these changes do not affect the organisation's existing members.[27] However, there is little indication that governments are willing to enact fundamental changes to a global economic system based upon the pillars of free trade and international competition. In almost all countries, the basic stimulus to economic growth is seen to come from increasing access to overseas markets, rather than prioritising domestic job creation or considering alternative ways of growth and diversification that cater to citizens' essential needs.[28]‘Protectionism' remains a dirty word in the corridors of power, and workers and businesses are still described as ‘standing in the way of progress' if they express worries about their trades being undercut by imports.

This is despite all the evidence that lowering tariffs and increasing world trade will not provide a lasting solution for job creation and economic growth, but will rather exacerbate the food, financial and climate crises that are engulfing the world [see box]. A dramatic change of paradigm is clearly needed if rich nations and global institutions are to stop forcing developing countries to liberalise their economies through the WTO or regional and bilateral trade negotiations. It is now more important than ever before that civil society and mass social movements unite in a common cause to turn around the dominant agenda of economic globalisation based on unfettered world markets.   


Box 19: Rejecting the free trade dogma

For most mainstream economists, policymakers and corporate executives across the world, the belief in free trade is pursued with an almost religious fervour. Through international free trade agreements and policies, developing countries are increasingly locked into a cycle of unfair competition as all sectors of their economy - from agriculture to banking - are progressively deregulated and liberalised to facilitate access to firms from abroad. Justified by the theory of comparative advantage, each country is told to specialize in whatever they grow or manufacture best and purchase everything else from abroad, regardless of the social or environmental consequences. The implications are that communities and nations should abandon self-reliance, produce only a few items for export, and give up their sovereignty over national development strategies in return for the promise of more jobs, more goods and a higher standard of living.[29]

Trade liberalisation has not always been achieved out of choice in developing countries. From the 1980s, conditions were attached to loans given to debt-stricken nations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank that enforced trade liberalisation as part of so-called ‘structural adjustment' policies. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) established in 1995 has also forced developing countries to open their markets and create new opportunities for transnational corporations and foreign investors. Although the preamble of the WTO agreement stated that its purpose was to increase employment, reduce poverty, diminish inequality and promote sustainable development around the world through free trade, it has largely failed to deliver on these goals and instead brought about the opposite results in many countries.

Following the systematic reduction of import tariffs and a shift to export-oriented production, workers who produce basic commodities such as cereals, timber and minerals are more impoverished than ever as a flood of low-cost imports has crashed prices since the WTO's launch. Food insecurity and malnutrition has increased as the land used to grow staples for basic needs is usurped by large producers, while displaced farmers move into cities and add to urban overcrowding, or move to fragile and less productive lands that quickly become overstressed. The frenzy to export has also undermined ecological sustainability as developing countries exploit natural resources, such as through forest clearing for timber exporting or palm oil production, cash crop exports that depend on polluting pesticides and fertilizers, or large fishing boats that destroy coral reefs and sea life.[30]

The winners and losers

The fight against poverty is still being lost despite the massive growth in world trade and the promise that a growing economy will benefit the poor. World exports multiplied almost five times between 1990 and 2010 and income more than doubled, but progress on improving education, health and nutrition was slower after the year 2000 when economies around the world were booming than in the previous decade.[31] Instead of generating income convergence between rich and poor countries as promised, free trade has exacerbated the income inequality between industrial and developing countries as well as between rich and poor within countries worldwide.[32] Even the growth benefits of trade liberalisation have been overstated; in the developing world, economic growth is lower than it was in the 1960s and 1970s before economic globalisation polices began to be pushed aggressively.[33]

The primary beneficiaries of free trade are the corporate executives and shareholders of large multinational corporations (MNCs), around 500 of which control 70% of world trade. The combined sales of the top 200 corporations grew faster than overall economic activity between 1983 and 1999, reaching the equivalent of almost 30% of world GDP, yet these firms employ only three-quarters of 1% of the world's workforce.[34] The secondary beneficiaries of free trade are the governments of high-income countries who experience economic growth through the trade activities of their domestic corporations - again predominantly large MNCs and agribusiness firms, as opposed to the majority of small and medium-sized farmers and producers.

The purely market-driven or ‘neoliberal' approach to economic and social policy that informs the strategies of the WTO, World Bank and IMF is clearly defunct and these institutions have long been in need of radical reform. In a globalised economy with huge discrepancies in the wealth and capabilities of rich and poor nations, it is essential that a more effective and inclusive global governance structure is established. As often stated by campaigners, this begins with putting trade firmly in its place so that it is viewed not as a goal in itself, but as a means to achieving broader social, environmental and economic development objectives. This requires a fundamental rethinking of the neoliberal model of global trade, as well as the myriad of related policies being implemented through the WTO and regional and bilateral trade regimes.


Learn more and get involved

Alliance for Responsible Trade: A coalition of US organisations campaigning for a different trade policy that serves first and foremost to promote equitable and sustainable development for all people. <www.art-us.org>

Alternatives to Economic Globalization: Edited by John Cavanagh and Jerry Mander, this book is a bold answer to critics who assert that the anti-corporate globalization movement does not have alternative proposals. Published by Berrett-Koehler, 2004.

Bilaterals.org: a collective effort to share information and stimulate cooperation against bilateral trade and investment agreements that are opening countries to the deepest forms of penetration by transnational corporations. < www.bilaterals.org>

Center of Concern: A faith-based organization providing information and analysis on economic justice issues. See the Rethinking Bretton Woods (RBW) section. <www.coc.org/rbw>

Focus on the Global South: An Asian NGO combining policy research, advocacy, activism and grassroots capacity building in order to generate critical analysis and encourage debates on national and international policies related to corporate-led globalisation, neo-liberalism and militarisation. <www.focusweb.org>

Kicking Away The Ladder: A now-classic book by Ha-Joon Chang that explains how industrialised nations are preventing developing countries from adopting the same protectionist trade policies that they themselves used to become rich. Published by Anthem Press, 2003.

The Luckiest Nut in the World: A short film by Emily James that follows an animated American peanut who sings about the difficulties of trade liberalisation in developing countries. <www.mediathatmattersfest.org/films/the_luckiest_nut_in_the_world>

Our World Is Not for Sale: A network of organizations, activists and social movements worldwide fighting the current model of corporate globalization embodied in the global trading system. <www.ourworldisnotforsale.org>

Signing Away the Future: An Oxfam paper from March 2007 that explains how the new free trade agreements being signed up between rich and poor countries are proving far more damaging to the poor than anything envisaged within WTO talks. <www.oxfam.org/en/policy>

Trade Justice Movement: A coalition of organisations based mainly in the UK that together call for trade justice - not free trade - with the rules weighted to benefit poor people and the environment. <www.tradejusticemovement.org.uk>

Whose Trade Organisation - A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO: An expose by Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall that reveals which WTO terms have led to U.S. job losses, the race to the bottom in wages, unsafe food, attacks on environmental and health laws, and burgeoning international inequality. Published by The New Press, New York, 2004, Distributed by Norton.


Notes:

[1] Note: Import tariffs are the primary but not the only way in which countries either liberalise trade or protect their economies. Non-tariff barriers to trade can include import and export licenses, quotas, subsidies, embargoes and other forms of regulation that serve to raise the price of traded products. A strict definition of free trade would mean the complete elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade.

[2] Timothy A. Wise and Kevin P. Gallagher, Doha Round and Developing Countries: Will the Doha deal do more harm than good?, RIS Policy Briefs No. 22, April 2006; Aldo Caliari, ‘The fiscal impact of trade liberalisation', in Matti Kohonen and Francine Mestrum (eds), Tax Justice: Putting Global Inequality on the Agenda, Pluto Press, 2009, p. 134.

[3] For example, see: John McGhie et al, The damage done: Aid, death and dogma, Christian Aid, May 2005; Justin Macmullan and Andrew Pendleton, Taking liberties Poor people, free trade and trade justice, Christian Aid, 2004.

[4] Data from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006, Washington D.C., 2006, Table 4.12. See Jens Martens, The Precarious State of Public Finance Tax evasion, capital flight and the misuse of public money in developing countries - and what can be done about it, Global Policy Forum, 2007, table 8, p. 22.

[5] OECD and African Development Bank, African Economic Outlook 2010, Special theme: Public Resource Mobilisation and Aid, 2010, p. 93.

[6] Figures drawn from World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington D. C., 2005, table 4.13. See Jens Martens, The Precarious State of Public Finance, op cit, p. 21.

[7] World Bank Group, World Development Indicators 2011, Washington: 2011, see table 4.14 on p. 248.

[8] African Economic Outlook 2010, op cit, p. 93.

[9] World Development Indicators 2011, op cit, see table 4.14 on pp. 246-248.

[10] T. Baunsgaard and M. Keen, Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalisation, IMF Working Paper WP/05/112, June 2005.

[11] Christian Aid et al, Tax Justice Advocacy Toolkit: A Toolkit for Civil Society, January 2011, p. 4.

[12] Note that this figure relates to NAMA (Non-Agricultural Market Access), the industrial goods agreement being negotiated in the WTO Doha Round. See: Kevin P. Gallagher, Putting Development back in the Doha Round, Yale Journal, Spring/Summer 2007, p. 117.

[13] Kym Anderson and Will Martin, Agricultural trade reform and the Doha development agenda, World Bank, 2005, table 12. Quoted in Christian Aid and SOMO, Tax Justice Advocacy, op cit.

[14] Note: The study estimated financial gains for sub-Saharan countries to $782.2m and revenue losses as $3385.2m. Net gains are therefore calculated as $2603m. See: South Centre, Economic Partnership Agreements in Africa: A Benefit-Cost Analysis, Analytical Note SC/TDP/AN/EPA/29, November 2011, p.12.

[15] Christian Aid, The economics of failure: The real cost of ‘free' trade for poor countries, June 2005, p. 2.

[16] Ibid, p. 1.

[17] Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective, Oxford Development Studies 31:1, 2003.

[18] See reference 13.

[19] See reference 14.

[20] World Trade Organization, Market Access: Negotiations, A simple guide - NAMA Negotiations, Accessed 28th November 2011, <www.wto.org>

[21] Martin Khor, ‘Crunch time arrives for WTO talks', Global Trends Series by Executive Director, 25th Apr 2011.

[22] Martin Khor, ‘Little progress in WTO's Doha talks', Global Trends Series by Executive Director, South Centre, 28th Feb 2011.

[23] International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, ‘2012 Should Not be a "Wasted Year," Lamy Urges WTO Members', Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol 16, No. 6., 15th February 2012.

[24] Chakravarthi Raghavan, ‘From bicycle to snowball approach to policy', SUNS #7300, Third World Network, 2nd February 2012.

[25] Martin Khor, ‘Need for Africa to Re-think the EPAs in Light of the Economic Crisis', Presentation at the African Union conference of Trade Ministers, Addis Ababa, 20th March 2009.

[26] For example, see: World Development Movement, Missing presumed dead: Whatever happened to the Development Round?, June 2006.

[27] Paige McClanahan, ‘New WTO rules ease entry for least developed countries', The Guardian, 6th July 2012.

[28] Jayati Ghosh, ‘The Export Obsession', Macro Scan, Economic Research Foundation, 17th November 2005,  <www.macroscan.org>

[29] David Morris, ‘Free Trade: The Great Destroyer', in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds), The Case Against the Global Economy, 1996, chapter 19.

[30] Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, Development Redefined: How the Market Met its Match, Paradigm Publishers, 2009.

[31] Social Watch, Basic Capabilities Index 2011. Economic growth does not ensure human well-being, Press Release, October 2011, <www.socialwatch.org>

[32] Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organisation: A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO, The New Press, 2004, p. 174.

[33] Mark Weisbrot, Robert Naiman and Joyce Kim, The Emperor Has No Growth: Declining Economic Growth Rates in the Era of Globalization, Centre for Economic and Policy Research, November 2000.

[34] John Cavanagh and Jerry Mander (eds), Alternatives to Economic Globalization, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2004, p. 44.